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Abstract: Marxist Internet scholars have recently shed light on the commodification and exploitation of 
social media users. While some of these studies have also acknowledged the ideological nature of how 
online sociality is understood and discussed, they have not yet addressed in great detail the ways in which 
ideology figures in the process of commodification of social media users. We address this question by 
combining Marxist ideology theory with insights from cognitive pragmatics. Focusing on the idea of illusion, 
we draw on Relevance Theory and employ the notions of “relevance” and “cognitive illusion” to discuss 
the ideological process we call context manipulation, a concept that helps bring to focus the discursive 
obscuring of the capitalist operational logic of social media corporations. We illustrate our cognitive-
pragmatic model of ideology with examples of Facebook’s discursive practices. The paper contributes to 
the discussion on ideology in cultural studies and the discussion on commodification of online sociality 
in critical Internet and media studies by offering a revised interpretation of Marx’s ideology theory that 
highlights the discursive and cognitive nature of ideological processes, and by elaborating on the workings 
of ideology in the specific context of corporate social media.
Keywords: Marx, ideology, illusion, pragmatics, Relevance Theory, social media
Our mission is to give people the power to build community and bring the world closer together.
Facebook Inc.
One of the largest Internet companies in the world, Facebook, Inc. has recently been at the centre of 
countless lawsuits, scandals and controversies involving issues ranging from privacy (e.g. Gibbs; Hern) to 
hate speech and fake news (e.g. Hogan and Safi). One of the most egregious scandals with serious and far-
reaching political and social consequences involves Cambridge Analytica. This data analytics and political 
consulting firm harvested data from tens of millions of Facebook users without their consent, and in 
addition to this, took efforts to influence the voting choices in the US presidential election of 2016 through 
targeted political advertising (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison). The case, which became public in March 
2018, put into serious question Facebook’s ability and willingness to control third parties operating on their 
platform, but on a more general level, the case also brought into spotlight questions about the ethics of 
massive data collection, bringing up concerns about safety. The question many now ask is why, under these 
conditions, people still agree to use Facebook and other similar social media platforms?
Within critical Internet and media studies, there has been a return to Marx that has paid attention 
to the inherent capitalist nature of contemporary communications systems. Fuchs (“Marx’s Capital in the 
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information age” 51), for example, emphasises how a “contemporary reading of Marx needs to be mediated 
with contemporary capitalism’s structures and the political issues of the day” which presently are the 
Internet, media, and communications in today’s media-saturated and mediated world. Indeed, scholars 
drawing on Marxist concepts have recently shed light on the increasing commodification of online sociality, 
arguing that users’ attention, data, as well as the content they produce are sold to advertisers by the 
platform owners (see e.g. Dyer-Witheford; Fisher & Fuchs; Fuchs, Digital Labour and Karl Marx; van Dijck). 
As Fuchs (“Marx’s Capital in the information age” 51) points out, “it is time to see Marx not just as a critic 
of capitalism but also as a critic of capitalist communications.” Indeed, the business model of Facebook is 
to provide both a platform and an audience for targeted digital advertising (see also Srnicek)—in 2017, 98 % 
of the company’s revenue came from advertising (as reported on the company’s investor relations website). 
This means that user presence on the platform, and more specifically the user data (data provided by the 
user and collected metadata) that allows for targeting advertising, are key parts of the product sold.
However, despite the increased focus on online commodification (see e.g. Fuchs, Digital Labour and 
Karl Marx) and the monetisation of social relationships (e.g. Skeggs & Yuill), little attention has been paid to 
the ideological processes that enable value extraction from social media users; in particular, the discursive 
dimension of these processes has mostly been sidelined. Yet, ideological processes can be understood 
as being to a significant degree discursive in nature (see, e.g. Fairclough; Herzog; van Dijk). Embedded 
in discourse(s), ideology is distributed by language as “we all live and communicate with and through 
‘ideology’” (Gee 29). For Marx, the ideas of the elite are always the hegemonic ideas (The German Ideology 
92; Marx and Engels 35); this means that ideology benefits the elite by representing social reality in ways 
that support their position and maintain their power. This is because ideology gives rise to illusions, making 
the working class unaware of the causes of their suffering. With this paper, we want to revisit this critical 
perspective on ideology and, in particular, the notion of ideology as illusion (see particularly Marx, The 
German Ideology, Marx & Engels; see also Marx, Capital vol. 1 e.g. The Fetishism of Commodities); we do this 
by approaching ideology from a cognitive-pragmatic perspective.
The non-relative view of truth and reality embedded in Marxist ideology theory (namely, that an objective 
truth exists and is obfuscated by ideology) has often been considered incompatible with poststructuralist, 
discursive perspectives. Laclau (298-99), for example, notes that the idea of illusion or distortion “made 
sense as long as something ‘true’ or ‘undistorted’ was considered to be within human reach.” In recent 
decades, the Marxist view of ideology has been largely abandoned in favour of more relativistic, value-
neutral conceptions of ideology, which see ideologies merely as “mental frameworks” (Hall, “The Problem 
of Ideology”) or “systems of ideas” (e.g. van Dijk). Some scholars within media and cultural studies have, 
however, called for a renewed attention to a critical perspective on ideology that continues in the Marxist 
tradition of ideology as illusion (Corner; Downey; Downey et al.; Downey and Toynbee). Also within 
discourse studies, Herzog, for example, has argued for a discursive approach to Marxist ideology theory.
To explore ideology in the social media context, we approach the nexus of language and ideology 
by drawing on Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson), a cognitive approach to linguistic pragmatics (on 
pragmatics, see Mey; Levinson) that builds on prior theorisation on human reasoning and emphasises 
cognitive inference in communication. This approach helps us explain the phenomenon of illusion in 
terms of communicative and cognitive processes involved in utterance interpretation and comprehension, 
highlighting the fallibility of these processes and showing how they can be manipulated. In particular, 
we employ the notions of relevance and cognitive illusion to theorise a discursive process we call context 
manipulation. This process involves making salient one interpretive context over another by communicative 
means (thereby signalling its optimal relevance for the reader). We argue that the discursive process of 
context manipulation gives rise to cognitive illusions (Johnson-Laird & Savary; Maillatt & Oswald) regarding 
the interpretation of the communicative content, and thus, in the context of corporate social media, of the 
nature of social media services. Cognitive illusion refers to the possibility of arriving at incorrect, or illusory, 
inference from a given premise, inherent in human cognitive reasoning (Johnson-Laird). In our context of 
corporate social media, we will illustrate how context manipulation blurs the operational logic of Facebook 
(premised on the commodification of users) so that users are provided with only a partial, often misleading 
representation of the conditions of their participation.
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With this theoretical paper, we thus address the gap in research regarding ideology and language in the 
context of online commodification and highlight the discursive and cognitive dimensions of ideology. We, 
therefore, contribute to the discussion on Marx and ideology theory in cultural studies and to the discussion 
in critical Internet and media studies on the commodification of online sociality. We do this by building a 
new theoretical perspective on the ideological processes underlying commodification of social media users 
and bring a cognitive-pragmatic perspective into dialogue with Marxist ideology theory.
Key Points in Marxist Ideology Theory
The concept of ideology is essential in understanding the acceptance by social media users of what some 
scholars have described exploitative relations (see, e.g. Fuchs; Fisher & Fuchs) with the platforms. For 
Marx, the relations of production, the material relations and conditions involved in the capitalist mode of 
production, constitute the economic structure of society, its “real foundation.” On this base, determined 
by it, arises the superstructure that comprises the legal, political, religious, artistic and philosophic forms 
of social consciousness which Marx considers ideological forms (A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy). There has been a widespread debate within Marxist literature regarding the degree to which 
the base actually determines the superstructure; although we agree with the principle that the base is 
fundamental, we also believe the superstructure does have important material consequences, meaning 
that it influences the base as well. Clearly, the material foundations of society and social consciousness are 
intimately interrelated. The capitalist system is thus upheld by economic relations on the one hand and 
ideological forms on the other.
Ideology works particularly to uphold the current social order by creating a “distortion of reality” 
(Larrain, 12). As Marx put it, ideology makes “men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a 
camera obscura” (The German Ideology 68). Furthermore, as Marx famously stated, the “ideas of the ruling 
class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (The German Ideology 92; Marx and Engels 35) where “the ruling 
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant 
material relationships grasped as ideas” (The German Ideology 92). These ruling ideas are invariably 
depicted “as the common interest of all the members of society …  as the only rational, universally valid 
ones” (The German Ideology 94), and thus difficult to contest. Power, then, is a key aspect of the Marxist 
theory of ideology because ideology serves to produce and reproduce asymmetrical power relations and 
inequality (e.g. Thompson; Fairclough). It is important to note that although ideology supports the interests 
of the elite, it does not necessarily mean that members of the elite intentionally spread ideas that they think 
are false (although sometimes they might do that); they themselves may also be blinded by the ideology. 
However, it also is worth noting that elites have access to resources, such as the mass media, which allow 
their ideas to spread much easier than those of the lower classes.
For Marx, then, ideology was fundamentally a negative phenomenon maintaining social inequality, a 
view that not all later scholars accept. Hall, for example, defines ideology simply as “the mental framework 
… which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render 
intelligible the way society works” (“The Problem of Ideology”). Moreover, the view of ideology as distortion 
or illusion has faced serious criticism in later work (e.g. Althusser; Hall; Thompson; Eagleton). Žižek (7) joins 
the critique, stating “ideology has nothing to do with ‘illusion’,” and explains: “a political standpoint can be 
quite accurate (‘true’) as to its objective content, yet thoroughly ideological.” The point Žižek is making is that 
from the perspective of defining something as ideological, the truth value of claims is of lesser importance 
than the fact that those claims are used to legitimise relations of social domination in a non-transparent way. 
An aspect of illusion thus remains also in Žižek’s view: it is not the ideological claims themselves but their 
relation to the legitimation of power that is distorted—not what is said but why it is said. We believe that the 
fundamental illusion, as Marx noted, lies in the perception that ideological claims (supporting the interests of 
the elite) are the only rational and universally valid ideas (The German Ideology 94).
Yet others criticise Marxist ideology theory for having a patronising attitude towards the “blind masses 
… unable to be cured of their illusions” (Rancière xvi), while we, the scholars, with our “superior wisdom,” 
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do recognise the distortion (Hall, “The Problem of Ideology” 30-31). However, while people belonging to the 
“masses” may in fact sometimes recognise the distortion, they might nevertheless feel powerless to change 
anything due to the social and economic circumstances they find themselves in (Na; see also Bauman). The 
issue of resignation resonates with Marx’s view that the adoption of ideology is a response to alienation 
(Morris). Although alienation can take many forms, it is broadly speaking a “lack of a sense of meaning” 
(Elster 41). For Marx, when a person is alienated, “he does not fulfil himself in his work but denies himself, 
has a feeling of misery rather than well-being, does not develop freely his mental and physical energies 
but is physically exhausted and mentally debased” (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 
15). As ideology is an expression of a set of beliefs, values, and commitments that allow orienting oneself 
in an otherwise chaotic world (Morris 31), it can offer, if not real self-actualisation, at least some sense of 
belonging and understanding the world.
However, Elster (41) notes that a lack of a sense of meaning does not necessarily imply a sense of a 
lack of meaning; that is, people do not always realise they are alienated. Adopting an ideology reduces the 
perception of alienation, without actually reducing alienation—religion is one example of this discussed 
by Marx (Capital vol. I). Ideological ways of thinking tend to value social cohesion and conformity at 
the expense of seeking truth; as a consequence, people are less aware of facts (Morris 31). This, in turn, 
reduces individual freedom to think and act, thus also preventing dealienation (Morris 31). Ideology, 
therefore, sustains capitalism, and alienation, by rationalising and legitimising the economic system and 
its consequences.
Commodification of the Internet and Online Sociality
In capitalism, personal worth is resolved into exchange value (Marx and Engels 12); this is an example 
of commodification, meaning transforming such things into commodities that were formerly outside of 
economic relationships and considered to have use value only (Mosco). This expansion of the domain of 
capital has also taken place in the online context where the social life of the users has been transformed 
into a marketable product and exchange value for the company. Although discussions of online interaction 
and social media usually highlight sociality instead of economic transaction (Lovink 9), Dahlberg, already 
in 2001, saw commodification as one of the greatest threats to the autonomy of public interaction online. 
Likewise, Thurlow points out how nowhere is commodification “more apparent than in Facebook where the 
meaning (and spaces) of social networking have been so fully co-opted (and colonized) by corporations” 
(232).
Commodification of the Internet is tightly intertwined with the prevailing neoliberal ideology (e.g. 
Lovink; Skeggs & Yuill; Harvey), the widespread use of social media indicating “the further extension 
of neoliberal modes of operating within intimate life” (Gill and Kanai). Critical Internet researchers (e.g. 
Kang & McAllister; Campbell & Carlson) have addressed the question of commodification by drawing from 
Smythe, who in the context of television coined the term “audience commodity,” arguing that audiences are 
being sold as commodity to advertisers; similarly, social media users (particularly their data and attention) 
are being commodified and sold to advertisers (Fuchs, “Dallas Smythe today”).
Social media users have, in fact, been conceptualised as both commodities and workers engaged in 
digital labour. It has been argued that in consuming capitalist social media, “users not just reproduce their 
labour power” by having fun on the site, but “produce commodities”—without the users’ participation 
and the content that they produce (and that attracts other users to spend time on the site), the companies 
would have nothing to sell (Fuchs, “Dallas Smythe today” 704). Thus, digital labour is being “exploited 
because it generates value and products that are owned by others” (Fuchs, “Dallas Smythe today” 705). For 
Marx, of course, labour power always was a commodity sold to employers. A key difference in this context 
is that users receive no monetary compensation for what they do for the site, but they are still a necessary 
part of the production of surplus value. In fact, they are the commodity in an exchange relation of two 
other parties, Facebook and its customers (advertising agencies and other organisations), with none of the 
monetary gain coming back to them.
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However, not all scholars agree that digital labour is a very useful concept to explain the problematic 
of the commercialised Internet. Skeggs and Yuill (386-88) argue that free labour is a “red herring” and that 
ownership, control, and the circulation of capital are much more significant questions. Indeed, we agree 
that the concept of labour tends to draw attention mainly to the content that users actively produce on 
Facebook, rather than the data that is passively harvested from them. This user “metadata” is a key part 
of the advertising product of Facebook, and it is also a valuable commodity in its own right, sold directly 
to advertisers to help in market research; this product is known as Facebook Topic Data. Importantly, 
this harvesting of data goes beyond the platform itself and extends to other sites, too, even when users 
are logged out of Facebook; Facebook tracks even people who do not have Facebook user accounts (e.g. 
“shadow profiles”) (Skeggs and Yuill). Because of the covert nature of this data harvesting, Skeggs and Yuill 
argue that the process is better described as expropriation rather than exploitation.
Ideology and Social Media
Several authors (e.g. Briziarelli; Fisher; Garnham; Lovink) have argued that both popular and academic 
discussion around information society and digital economy is often deeply ideological as any possible 
problems related to the Internet and social media tend to be glossed over. Yet, the new data economy is 
characterised by asymmetric power relations that favour those with access to data and the capability to 
make sense of it; this is justified by discourses that focus on the social and political benefits of social media 
(Myers West 4-5).
Similarly, contemporary social media is presented as “free” and socially beneficial—a form of 
“participatory culture” and “new democracy” (Fuchs, “Dallas Smythe today”; Na). An older idea of 
participatory culture was, in fact, appropriated by social media corporations that have deliberately 
conflated “human connectedness” and “automated connectivity” when they refer to “social” media (van 
Dijck 11-13). These discursive tactics serve to blur the capitalist operational logic by focussing on “what 
people do through platforms rather than critical issues of ownership, rights, and power” (Baym 1). 
Thus, sociality, community and a sense of belonging are among the social benefits marshalled to 
attract users to voluntarily offer their data to Facebook (Skeggs and Yuill); these are also some of the factors 
that make using social media appear de-alienating. Using social media, although seemingly voluntary, is 
nevertheless done under illusions of ideology. Fuchs (“Dallas Smythe today”), for example, argues that 
digital labour is “ideologically coerced.” meaning that not participating in social media carries a (perceived) 
threat of social isolation: there is an ideological belief that we need to be on social media. In addition, 
ideological illusions also apply to the business models of social media corporations, of which people 
are often seemingly unaware. For example, Srnicek (48) argues that, as people call for more privacy on 
Facebook, they are missing the fact that “the suppression of privacy is at the heart of this business model.”
The distorting effect of ideology can be intensified by the fact that, in the modern world, the labour 
market and life generally are increasingly insecure as employment is often short-termed and precarious 
(Bauman). Bauman (35) observes that as people struggle in their daily lives just to survive, it is difficult to 
see past one’s own predicament, and thus no organised, collective action toward social improvement is 
possible. Similarly, social media users often struggle to grasp the bigger picture. Regarding the inability 
to change the circumstances of digital life, we have previously argued that by using social media, users 
simultaneously (although perhaps unwittingly) participate in legitimating both the practices and the 
value extraction model of these corporations (Lillqvist & Harju). Yet, as long as users remain unaware 
of the exploitative nature of corporate social media, they cannot instigate change or engage in collective 
resistance. In Digital Labour and Karl Marx, Fuchs further points out that because users as digital labour are 
unable to organise, they do not form a politically conscious working class, forming instead a new “digital 
proletariat.”
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Ideology and language: Insights from Relevance Theory
Marx saw both language and ideology as tightly interwoven with social and material reality and processes 
of social reproduction. Marx had a modern—interactional and concrete—view of the role of consciousness 
and language, and he emphasised, in particular, their connection to the material world:
language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it exist for me … 
Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. (Marx, 
The German Ideology 74)
As Herzog notes, ideology makes for a suitable object of linguistic enquiry, particularly when adopting a 
discursive perspective and examining “language and practices of signification in social context” (1). We 
believe (linguistic) pragmatics provides a framework compatible with a Marxist approach as pragmatics 
focuses on language in its social context and includes implicit meaning in the account of language and 
communication.
Pragmatics can be defined as the study of language in context (Mey; Levinson). Emphasising the social 
dimension of pragmatic enquiry, Mey (6) notes how a “truly pragmatic consideration has to deal with 
the users in their social context; it cannot limit itself to the grammatically encoded aspects of contexts.” 
Communication, then, is more than the semantic content of a sentence; an utterance “has a variety of 
properties, both linguistic and non-linguistic” (Sperber & Wilson 9), including contextual factors and varying 
inputs from both “internal” and “external” sources (Sperber & Wilson 261). Internal sources refer to each 
individual bringing with them to the communicative event their own cognitive environment (see Sperber & 
Wilson 38), including prior knowledge and assumptions, all of which figure in the interpretation process 
by adding to or modifying the context selected. External sources include not only the immediate contextual 
factors, the grammatically encoded context, but also the wider socio-cultural context. Regarding corporate 
social media, for example, the wider context includes actions taken by platform owners (e.g. censoring 
content), news written about them (e.g. on the recent case of Cambridge Analytica), and conversations 
among users (whether online or offline). Thus, what is communicated by Facebook is interpreted against 
an immensely rich and varied canvas of a context that is not limited to the immediate cotext (i.e. textual 
context).
Two Principles of Relevance
Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson) provides an intricate pragmatic theory by developing an inferential 
model of communication that stresses the role of cognition and, particularly, the importance of inferential 
processes in utterance interpretation. Built on the Gricean model of pragmatic inference (see Grice, “Logic 
and Conversation”; “Meaning”), Relevance Theory takes from Grice the Maxim of relation (that states, “Be 
relevant”) and develops it into the Principle of Relevance (see Sperber & Wilson 155). Relevance Theory 
(Sperber & Wilson 260-61) posits two claims about cognition and communication:
1. Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance (Cognitive Principle)
2. Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance 
(Communicative Principle)
Relevance-seeking as a human cognitive tendency underlies the theory, giving Relevance Theory its 
explanatory power. Referring to communication (Communicative Principle), the Principle of Relevance 
states that the communicator is seen as always communicating a “presumption of relevance” (Sperber & 
Wilson 156). Simply put, what people communicate is interpreted by the hearer-reader as having optimal 
relevance to them in the context, rendering the communicative content important in some way and thus 
worthy of the hearer’s attention (Sperber & Wilson). Importantly, what is communicated is thus not expected 
to be irrelevant. 
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Inferential system of interpretation
Interpretation in the Relevance-theoretic framework (Sperber & Wilson; Wilson & Sperber; Wilson) goes 
beyond decoding of literal meaning to include an inferential phase as a crucial part of the interpretation 
process, guided by both relevance and contextual cues. Therefore, not only the literal meaning of the 
utterance but also the conceptual representation conjured up in the mind of the individual interpreter (the 
hearer-reader), based on the utterance, feed into the interpretation process. Individuals thus construct 
different conceptual representations of the same utterance, depending on the contextual information at 
hand (both external and internal input).  The unique cognitive environment (Sperber and Wilson 38) of 
each individual (i.e. prior knowledge, assumptions, etc.) makes it possible to reconcile how different people 
interpret the same utterance in different ways. It is also important to note, as Wilson and Sperber (9) point 
out, that “the primary bearers of truth conditions are not utterances but conceptual representations,” 
which explains divergent interpretations of the same utterance.
Contexts, then, are highly variable and highly individualised. While communication makes manifest 
a certain context (Sperber & Wilson 156), context selection on the part of the interpreter is guided by the 
overall Principle of Relevance coupled with individual’s external and internal inputs. All these add to the 
range of contextual cues: the outcome of the interpretation process and its relevance will be assessed “in 
terms of all contextual effects achieved” (Sperber & Wilson 263).
Wilson explains that communicators have two distinct goals: they want the hearer-reader to understand 
their meaning, but they also want to persuade them to believe it. Equally, recipients have two tasks: first, 
to understand the communicator’s meaning, and second, to assess the meaning they recover, and based 
on this assessment either believe it or discard it. The first task relies on people’s pragmatic ability to infer 
meaning from the available linguistic and contextual cues, whereas the second task entails assessing the 
accuracy of the interpretation to avoid being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. Some conclusions 
may indeed be invalid; but in terms of how the human cognitive system and reasoning functions, truth is 
not a factor as such.
Context Manipulation
Relevance-seeking tendencies also cater to misleading communicative ends. Wilson and Sperber (254) state 
that the “universal cognitive tendency to maximise relevance makes it possible, at least to some extent, to 
predict and manipulate the mental states of others.” Relevance-seeking tendency thus allows for context 
manipulation whereby some contexts can be made more salient and more relevant (salient contexts) by 
the communicator while other contexts are avoided (obscured contexts). The interpretation process is thus 
constrained (see Maillatt & Oswald), and here lies the possibility for context manipulation: manipulating 
the context relies on new information adding to or modifying the old in such a way that the sum total of 
contextual effects guides the inference toward a specific conclusion.
Writing about cognitive models of reasoning, Johnson-Laird and Savary (191, emphasis added) note 
that when reasoning, people build mental models of situations that “normally make explicit only what 
is true” due to a fundamental representational principle of human reasoning. There is a cognitive bias 
towards interpreting utterances as true (Johnson-Laird and Savary; Johnson-Laird; see also Grice, “Logic 
and conversation”) rather than false; thus, this process also produces fallacious yet compelling inferences, 
that is, illusory inferences.
Johnson-Laird and Savary explain how such compelling but invalid inferences can occur: when presented 
with two premises, and being told one of them is true and the other false, reasoners will almost invariably 
forget one is false and instead base their inference on both being true. Johnson-Laird (419) emphasises that 
“because we can’t hold in mind more than a few possibilities, we tend to focus on what’s true at the expense 
of what’s false”; in order to disregard false interpretations among all the possibilities, we would first have 
to entertain what is false, which we often fail to do. This resonates with the Relevance-theoretic notion that 
communication is assumed relevant; it is also assumed true because a premise that is true is also more 
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relevant. The difficulty of keeping in mind the possibility of falsity opens up the possibility for manipulating 
the context by not only selecting what to include or exclude, but also by providing information that seems 
plausible, or that is only partially true.
Context manipulation, then, is best defined in terms of the constraints it imposes on mental processing, 
(mis)leading people to process information in a restricted way (Maillat & Oswald). The process exploits 
the inherent weaknesses of the human cognitive system and reasoning (see Johnson-Laird), leading to 
“cognitive illusions” (Maillatt & Oswald): thus, conclusions may seem logically valid, while not being 
accurate reflections of the “state of affairs in the world” (Sperber & Wilson).
Analysing Context Manipulation: The Case of Facebook 
In this section, we revisit earlier empirical work (Lillqvist & Harju) on Facebook communication and 
discuss it from a cognitive-pragmatic perspective. We also provide some further examples that illustrate 
the communicative strategies of Facebook that in addition to discursive aspects also occur at the level of 
interface design. With this, we demonstrate the workings of the discursive process of context manipulation, 
the underlying principle of our cognitive-pragmatic model of ideology.
In their communication about the service, Facebook foregrounds social life and provides information 
that explicitly supports the perception of increased sociality and connection. The four main interpretive 
contexts (Lillqvist & Harju) that Facebook makes salient all focus on what the platform offers the users: 
it rhetorically offers protection (from bullying, from harmful or offensive content, against data piracy and 
theft), freedom of speech (within limits set in the Community Standards), social connection, as well as 
general altruism—being concerned about the users, their satisfaction and well-being. These more salient 
contexts contribute to the external contextual cues shaping interpretation, and they all emphasise benefits 
for the user.
What is lacking is any reference to the monetisation of sociality; there is also no mention of the 
drawbacks of using the service (e.g. compromised data security). However, users garner additional 
information from other sources that add to the external contextual cues, for example, information on data 
harvesting and compromised privacy, and bring these issues up as alternative contexts (Lillqvist & Harju), 
making visible the incompleteness of the information Facebook provides. For example, Facebook claims 
to protect users’ against hate speech, yet some users criticise this by saying enforcement of the rules is 
insufficient and inconsistent: while the platform bans some hate speech, it allows others. Interestingly, 
however, the contexts made salient by the company are often echoed by users, which demonstrates the 
normalisation of ideology on Facebook.
Context manipulation is not limited to how Facebook describes the platform, or to discourse alone, 
but can be detected in the very design of the service. For example, in a report commissioned by the Belgian 
Privacy Commission, Van Alsenoy et al. (40) point out the imbalance regards control over privacy, noting 
how “Facebook’s privacy settings offer users considerable control when it comes to regulating access of 
their data by other users”; however, much less control is given “in relation to the collection and/or use of 
data by Facebook itself or by third-parties.” This way, Van Alsenoy et al. argue, the design “gives users a 
false sense of control.” In terms of context manipulation, Facebook privileges one perspective on privacy 
over the other, making it more salient. Facebook thus prioritises the context of social interaction over that 
of the capitalist operational logic.
In addition to the various contexts constructed, the methods used for making certain contexts salient 
over others, and thus constraining the interpretation process, is another interesting aspect of context 
manipulation. For example, repetition as a rhetorical strategy is a powerful tool for instilling ideological 
thought, as illustrated by a quote from Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of Facebook:
When you have access to the internet, you have more voice. When you have better tools for sharing, you have more voice. 
When you have fewer laws limiting your speech, you have more voice. When you do not live in fear of social isolation or 
violence if you express yourself, you have more voice. (Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook post on 16 March 2015)
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By repeatedly emphasising the context of freedom of speech by using the phrase “you have more 
voice,” Zuckerberg is constructing an interpretive context where the service seems solely beneficial with 
no drawbacks while implying that not using the service lessens one’s autonomy and freedom of speech. 
It is worth noting that Facebook is not alone in communicating the interpretive context(s) of enhanced 
sociality and freedom, but these interpretations are reflected and reproduced by many users as well; this is 
precisely how discourse operates ideologically, gradually becoming commonly accepted and normalised as 
it spreads. It is also what makes it so powerful.
 In addition to the discursive, the methods used for making certain contexts salient can be examined 
at the level of interface design. These include introducing unnecessary complexity and unclarity (hidden 
settings for privacy, long and obfuscated Terms and Conditions, etc.) and insufficient information (for giving 
informed consent, or regarding privacy or data ownership, etc.). In terms of complexity and unclarity, the 
Belgian privacy commission found in 2015 that Facebook violated European consumer protection law, 
specifically the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (Gibbs), as users must “navigate Facebook’s complex web 
of settings (which include ‘Privacy’, ‘Apps’, ‘Ads’, ‘Followers’, etc.) in search of possible opt-outs” (Van 
Alsenoy et al. 41). The default settings on Facebook, and thus the design, support commodification while 
options for changing the settings are made less salient.
Regarding insufficient information, Facebook’s privacy settings were ruled illegal in Germany in 2018, 
where a Berlin regional court found Facebook in violation of German consumer law because the platform 
provides insufficient information to users about collecting and using their personal data (Hern). Similarly, 
the Article 29 Working Party that oversees data regulation issues across the European Union noted that 
the view where consent is requested for data sharing between WhatsApp and Facebook “made no mention 
at all of the key information users needed to make an informed choice, namely that clicking the agree 
button would result in their personal data being shared with the Facebook family of companies” (Hern). 
This means that due to insufficient information, users are unable to give meaningful consent (Hern). These 
examples illustrate how ideology manifests materially in obscure interface design as well as in insufficient 
communication about the functions and purposes of these features.
Facebook’s communication has on several occasions violated the Principle of Relevance by breaching 
the presumption of optimal relevance (Sperber & Wilson; see also Grice “Logic and Conversation”), for 
example, regarding sufficient information to give informed consent. The context manipulation strategies 
of Facebook aim to ensure and maximise monetary gain which is achieved by attracting and retaining 
users; this is achieved by obscuring the context of commodification (involving data mining and privacy 
violations) because this would disclose the disadvantages of using the service. It follows from the Principle 
of Relevance that given the main context Facebook highlights as relevant, the context of sociality, users 
are cognitively justified in arriving at the interpretation that using social media is for their benefit and that 
they can do so safely. There are ethical issues with a value extraction model that is not based on informed 
consent or genuinely voluntary and mutual agreement, but rather, on solicitation (Lillqvist & Harju) and 
miscommunication.
Toward a Cognitive-Pragmatic Model of Ideology
The cognitive-pragmatic model of ideology developed in this paper revisits Marx’ idea of ‘ideology as 
illusion’ and builds on prior theorisation on human reasoning (Johnson-Laird & Savary; Maillatt & Oswald; 
Johnson-Laird) and on cognitive inference in communication (Sperber & Wilson). In line with the Relevance-
theoretic view, users interpret a message (e.g. Facebook communication) in a way most relevant to them in 
the (wider) context, guided by the Principle of Relevance together with (internal and external) contextual 
cues. Furthermore, there is a crucial assumption that what the speaker communicates is not only relevant 
but also true: the human inferential process thus incorporates a level of trust in the communicator, which 
in the process of context manipulation is exploited.
Interestingly, from the perspective of Marxist ideology theory, examination of human cognitive processes 
has shown that people can both be aware of real conditions and be under an illusion: for example, it is 
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difficult to remember that premises may not correspond to real circumstances (Johnson-Laird & Savary). 
Importantly, as Sperber and Wilson (263) point out, whether a premise is objectively “true” or “false” 
has little bearing in terms of the cognitive steps that are taken during the inferential process. Ideological 
illusions thus arise because of the inherent fallibility in human reasoning.
In terms of commodification of users and the prevalent business model of corporate social media, 
ideology can be seen as a discursive process promoting information favourable to the communicator, the 
corporate social media. This process happens through context manipulation that gives rise to cognitive 
illusions whereby the representation of “the state of affairs in the world” may not be accurate or complete. 
Moreover, the ideological obscuring and constraining of information extend to the material dimension at 
the level of interface design.
Figure 1. Cognitive-pragmatic model of ideology illustrating commodification of online sociality.
Figure 1 summarises the ideological discursive process involved in commodification of online sociality. 
The interpretive contexts Facebook provides emphasise the dimension of sociality and human connection 
as the raison d’être of the platform. In other words, using Marx’s terminology, Facebook emphasises the 
use value of the service while the exchange value of participation is never explicitly communicated. By 
constraining the inferential process this way, Facebook obscures the capitalist value extraction through 
the commodification of sociality and instead promotes the ideological acceptance of the business model. 
Through this acceptance the users in effect sanction it.
Conclusion
In order to enhance our understanding of why users continue to use social media services despite the 
many public controversies, we set out to examine the ideological dimension of commodification of online 
sociality, approaching ideology specifically as a discursive process from a cognitive-pragmatic perspective. 
We employed the Relevance-theoretic notion of relevance (Sperber & Wilson) together with the notion of 
cognitive illusion (Maillatt & Oswald) to discuss the discursive process we call context manipulation, the 
underlying principle of our cognitive-pragmatic approach to ideology.  By drawing on cognitive pragmatics 
and research on human reasoning, we bring back the notion of ideology as illusion and thus provide a 
renewed, discursive understanding of Marxist ideology theory. The paper thus contributes to the discussion 
on ideology theory in cultural studies and to the discussion on commodification of online sociality in 
critical Internet and media studies.
We have revised the notion of ideology as illusion to be more relevant for the contemporary capitalist 
context and digital media, but also to reflect the current understanding of language and human cognition 
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which are crucial to ideology theory. The cognitive-pragmatic perspective shows that illusions are part of 
human reasoning when the cognitive system is fed information that supports such (illusory) inferences. 
Thus, by arguing for the importance of context as a crucial element in ideological discourse, we have shown 
the ways in which it is possible to manipulate the context to construct an interpretive environment that 
seems favourable and relevant, and how this may give rise to cognitive illusions (Johnson-Laird & Savary; 
Maillatt & Oswald), regarding, for example, the nature of social media participation. 
In emphasising the importance of context, we have also discussed the role of salience of contextual cues 
and their impact on inference. Resonating with this, Corner (271, emphasis added) argues that “exploring 
the distribution of salience and of marginality in political and economic narratives” offers a way forward 
in ideology research; in developing our cognitive-pragmatic perspective to ideology we take seriously this 
call and make visible the discursive mechanisms that privilege some interpretive frameworks within which 
some interpretations become more salient, appearing, therefore, more valid. 
The concept of context manipulation helps bring to focus the discursive obscuring of certain contexts 
and how power is implicated in this practice, raising the question of who benefits from such discursive 
practice and whose power it legitimates. We thus contend that context manipulation functions as a 
discursive mechanism of ideological persuasion that exploits the inherent flaws in the human cognitive 
system. Furthermore, it is paramount not to restrict ourselves to the analysis of how ideology works, to 
unpacking the discursive and cognitive dimensions of ideology, but we also need to explicitly criticise, 
for example, the business models of social media organisations. It is in this way, to quote Herzog (11), that 
“the critique of ideologies becomes not only a critique of practices of justifications but turns into a genuine 
social critique.”
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